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The recent management literature on multinational corporations (MNCs) has 
mainly focused on the new role played by subsidiaries within the international firms. 
Many scholars have underlined that MNCs tend to organise themselves along a 
differentiated network approach, where subsidiaries play a very different role according 
to their internal resources and the significance of the local environment. This strategic 
and organisational model dates back to the pioneering work of Bartlett and Goshal, who 
called this new international strategy “Transnational” so as to differentiate it from the 
classical Multidomestic and Global strategies. Along with the different roles played by 
the subsidiaries, this model is characterised by the simultaneous existence of 
cooperation and competition within the multinational corporations. 
The present work focuses on the role of the Italian subsidiary of Agilent 
Technologies, a multinational firm with around 36,000 employees that is active in more 
than 40 countries in high-tech sectors such as electronics, telecommunications and life 
science. 
The case study brought new light to the usual distinction that is commonly made 
with regard to the role of a subsidiary. When we try to apply the Transnational model to 
Agilent we realise that neither this model nor the traditional typologies (Multidomestic, 
Global) apply to the case we have studied. The role of the subsidiary changes 
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Onetti is author of the sections 5, 6 and 7. significantly according to the function being considered. Therefore, we conclude that 
the role of function should be re-evaluated when the strategy and the structure of an 
MNC is defined. Not only does the classification of subsidiaries change according to 
the function in question, but the strategic posture and the organisational structure of 
MNCs should also be re-evaluated in light of the function under consideration. Our 
study shows how activities such as R&D, where coopetition represents a strategic 
source of advantage, seem to follow the Transnational scheme, while others such as 
sales are mainly globally managed.  
 
1. Introduction 
Since the pioneering works by Hedlund (1986) and Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989), 
a growing stream of literature has been devoted to the analysis of the different 
organisational approaches taken by multinational corporations (MNC). Most of these 
studies (Harzing, 2000) have taken for granted that multinationals mainly follow three 
different strategic approaches that have been defined along two different criteria. One 
variable (Prahalad and Doz, 1987) is integration/coordination, which measures the level 
of integration among the different worldwide activities of the MNCs. The second 
variable concerns product/service development and involves the choice between 
standardization and adaptation to local needs. 
On the basis of these variables three different models have emerged in the 
literature as the typical ideal models (Harzing, 2000). Scholars who have studied the 
strategy and structure of the MNCs in the last twenty years have put forward a wide 
range of different definitions. Using Porter’s (1986) terminology, we can define the 
models in the following way. The first model is the so-called Multidomestic, which 
combines a low degree of integration and a high degree of local adaptation. On the 
opposite end is the Global firm characterised by high integration and low local 
responsiveness, while the in-between model, the Transnational solution, combines local 
adaptation with a high level of integration. 
In recent times, the Transnational model has attracted much attention due to its 
ability to conciliate the need for high economies of scale with the marketing 
requirement to follow the needs of different clients according to their geographical 
position. This model seems to effectively respond to the different competing needs that 
firms face in many industries (Makhija, Kim and Williamson, 1997). Pressures such as 
common needs or economies of scale force corporations to reinforce global integration. 
On the other hand, geographic dispersion is needed in order to respond to different 
customer needs, the requests by local governments, and to exploit assets that are 
location-specific. 
The study of the Transnational model raises many interesting questions in terms 
of organisational design. Transnational corporations typically operate in a large number 
of countries. This dispersion raises two different and related questions. The first 
concerns control methodology and the second the role of subsidiaries in these kinds of 
MNCs. Many authors (White and Poynter, 1990, Prahalad and Doz, 1981) underline 
that with dispersed activities the usual hierarchical methods of controls were ineffective 
and the network configuration requires new methods of control based on informal 
systems and mechanisms. This leads to the overlapping of formal and informal methods 
of control and to the development of intense relationships among subsidiaries. The 
second aspect regards the differentiation of the role played by subsidiaries, which leads to different specialisations. According to Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989) the Transnational 
model can be described as an integrated network where the knots of the network can 
play different roles. 
This differentiation of the role of subsidiaries has led to numerous studies 
(Jarillo and Martinez 1990, Birkinshaw, 1997; Frattocchi and Holm 1998, Frost, 
Birkinshaw and Ensign, 2002) that have focused on the role of these subsidiaries in the 
network and highlighted the strategic role of the subsidiaries and the development of 
new relationships between headquarter and subsidiaries as well as between subsidiaries. 
The present work presents a case study approach to the problem of the subsidiary’s role 
in a high-tech MNC.  
In our study, we have tested the robustness of the Transnational model from the 
point of view of the subsidiaries. In so doing, we realise that previous papers, with some 
exceptions (Malnight, 1995, and Kim, Park and Prescott, 2003) severely underestimate 
the role of functions when testing the model. In analysing the case we jump to the 
conclusion that the role of subsidiaries radically changes according to the kind of 
function involved. 
The paper is organised in the following way. The first part presents an overview 
of the literature on the role of subsidiaries in MNCs. The subsequent sections describe 
the methodology and present the case. A discussion and conclusion then follow. 
 
2. The Role of Subsidiaries in Modern MNCs 
The idea that subsidiaries can have different strategies within the same MNC is 
at the heart of the Transnational model. Once again a decisive contribution has been 
made by scholars such as Prahalad and Doz (1981), Bartlett (1986), and Ghoshal and 
Noria (1989) , who were among the first to identify a new role for subsidiaries within 
the multinational corporation. Bartlett (1986) criticizes the doctrine of “symmetrical 
treatment” of subsidiaries. Implicitly highlighting the negative aspects of the 
multidomestic model, he states that (pg. 89): “International subsidiaries shouldn’t just 
be pipelines to move products. Their own special strengths can help build competitive 
advantage”. The idea he consequently supports is that subsidiaries should be 
differentiated along two different lines: the competences that reside in the subsidiary 
and the strategic importance of the local environment. The resulting classification of 
subsidiaries was as follows: Strategic Leaders, which are important units in important 
locations; Contributors, which are subsidiaries with distinctive capabilities but in a 
trivial environment; Implementers, which are national entities in a limited market with 
resources that reflect the role of the market; and Black Holes, i.e. foreign units with 
scarce resources but in a relevant location. 
Gupta and Govindarajan (1991, 2000) follow a similar approach by classifying 
subsidiaries not according to resources but to the flow of knowledge attracted and 
dispersed by the units.  
A different but similar approach has been proposed by Jarillo and Martinez 
(1990) and by Roth and Morrison (1992), who classified subsidiary strategy using the 
configuration and coordination variables, thus mirroring Porter’s (1986) classification 
of international strategies (see Figure 1).  
Figure 1. Subisidiaries’ Classification 
 
Source Martinez: and Jarilllo (1991, pg.434) 
 
 
The idea put forward by many scholars (Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998, and 
Taggart, 1998) that, within the network, there are subsidiaries with a strategic role, has 
been particularly successful and has led to an intense analysis of what has been called 
the “centre of excellence”. Frost, Birkinshaw and Ensign (2002) define these units as 
those centres recognised within the MNCs as important sources of value creation. The 
authors emphasize that the role of the subsidiary is defined, not only by the resources 
embodied in the organisational units and by the linkages with important external 
entities, but also by the recognition of the subsidiary’s importance by other units within 
the MNCs. Significantly, the authors find that the relative importance of these factors 
changes according to the function in question. More recently, Rugman and Verbeke 
(2001) have questioned the idea that a subsidiary can be categorized in a simple way 
based on a few variables. They accept the idea that an MNC can be viewed as a 
differentiated network of dispersed activities, but at the same time they refuse the idea 
that (p. 239): “each subsidiary perform a single well -defined role within the MNC”. In 
their paper the authors define different patterns of subsidiary competence building 
within MNCs, starting from the definition of country-specific advantages and firm-
specific advantages. The geographical sources of the firm’s specific advantages and the 
distinction between location-bound and non-location bound defines ten different 
patterns of competence building within international firms and a quite large set of roles 
played by subsidiaries. One of their main conclusions is that any attempt to classify a 
subsidiary’s role is becoming less and less relevant. 
 3. Methodology and Case Study  
The Transnational model has had a significant impact on the management 
literature: in fact, this organizational model is indicated as the solution for the various 
organizational problems of the multinational corporation. Despite the theoretical success 
of the model there is still scant empirical support for it (Hedlund and Ridderstrale, 
1997). Apart from the authors who first contributed to developing the model (Prahalad 
and Doz, 1987; Bartlett and Goshal, 1989; Bartlett and Goshal, 1993, White and 
Poynter, 1990; Maljeris, 1992), most of the literature has focused on the use of 
quantitative analysis methodologies based on questionaires (Leong and Tang, 1993; 
Harzing, 2000). The value of these analyses is that they take into consideration a large 
number of corporations and thus offer a solid empirical base. Nevertheless, the need to 
translate complex concepts into quantitative terms necessarily results in a simplification 
of the detailed organizational model that the Transnational corporation represents. Thus, 
we believe that in addition to these quantitative analyses an in-depth analysis, such as 
the one offered is required of cases that allow us to evaluate if and how this 
organizational model has been implemented in practice. This study of the Agilent 
Technologies group is an attempt to achieve this goal.  
 
The present study differs from most of the others in one further way. We do not 
adopt the headquarters point of view but instead that of the subsidiary, in particular that 
of the Italian subsidiary of a high-tech firm. This approach, as other authors has already 
underlined (Birkinshaw and Morrison 1995), has limits as well as advantages. The limit 
is that by taking the point of view of the subsidiary’s management our analysis does not 
consider, or does so only partially, the strategic choices made at the corporate level. 
Nevertheless, it is at the subsidiary level that the Transnational model produces its most 
important effects by emphasizing the role of some subsidiaries – that end up in the role 
of true centres of excellence (Frost, Birkinshaw and Ensign, 2002) – and assigning them 
tasks that go beyond narrow local limits and belong to the corporate level (functions, 
specific activities or products). The subsidiary point of view has in fact been analysed 
by some authors (Martinez and Jarillo, 1991; Andresson, Forsgren and Holm, 2002; 
Frost, Birkinshaw and Ensign, 2002) by means of quantitative analyses. These authors 
have pointed out that greater autonomy for the subsidiaries leads to a greater role within 
the MNC and a higher level of embeddedness between the subsidiary and the local 
companies. 
 
4. The business case: Agilent Technologies 
  Agilent Technologies is a multinational corporation that operates in various 
technological sectors in rapidly developing markets, such as communications, 
electronics, chemical analyses and life sciences. Once a part of Hewlett-Packard, on 
November 18, 1999, it was spun off and became an independent joint-stock company 
listed on the New York Standard Exchange. Today Agilent Technologies has a global 
reach with factories in over 40 countries employing 28,000 persons, and with a sales 
network operating in 110 countries. Agilent net revenue amounts to more than 6 billion 
US dollars. 
  Agilent Technologies is composed of five business units internally defined as 
groups, which are listed below: -  Electronic Products Solutions Group (EPSG): this business unit deals with 
electronic apparatus;  
-  Semiconductor Products Group (SPG): this business unit produces 
semiconductor components. Its products are directed mainly at the Networking 
market, where it produces fiber optic devices and high-speed integrated circuits, 
as well as the Personal Systems market, where the devices are used for 
applications such as mobile phones, PC peripherals, printers and, more 
generally, consumer electronic goods;  
-  Automated Test Group (ATG): test system solutions for speeding up and 
improving the production of semiconductor devices and printed circuit cards;   
-  Communications Solutions Group (CSG): products for telecommunications 
firms (wireless communication instruments, products for testing wireline 
devices, solutions for photon measurement), systems for monitoring, managing 
and optimizing communications networks, and software design instruments;  
-  Life Sciences and Chemical Analysis Group (LSCAG): this unit produces both 
classic products (instruments, software and applications for identifying, 
quantifying and analysing the physical and chemical characteristics of 
substances and products) and biotechnology products. 
 




Source: Internal reworking of Agilent Technologies Data  
 
5. The International Configuration of Agilent Technologies 
 
Agilent Technologies has a complex organizational structure which at first 
glance shows a divisional arrangement. As mentioned above, Agilent is composed of 
five business units identified by product type, or technological base. Consistent with its 
high-tech nature, Agilent’s business units are grouped mainly along technological lines: 
this is shown by the fact that several of the business units serve the same clients by 
satisfying different use functions with different technologies. For example, IBM and 
Ericcson are clients of three business units (EPSG, SPG and ATG), and Cisco of four 
(EPSG, ATG, SPG and CSG). The firm has a certain degree of diversification: while 
strongly focused on electronics and communications – which are managed by four 
business units that generate over 80% of total sales revenue – it also has a business unit 























EPSG The business units have a high degree of strategic autonomy. To begin with, they 
are distinct centres of profit and thus are responsible for the profits and losses of the 
unit. Moreover, and it is this criterion that best supports the above thesis, the business 
units are responsible for the vast majority of the primary activities in the value chain: 
strategic marketing, applied research, and production and sales are all autonomous 
managed by each business unit. When we refer to the control of the value chain we 
mean that the business units autonomously decide on both the product-market 
combinations (which markets and clients to serve, and with which products) and where 
the various activities will be located. An example of this is the acquisition in 2000 of 
part of the Telecom Italia laboratories in Turin. This operation was decided on and 
managed by the Semiconductor Products Group (SPG) business unit; the headquarter 
only intervened to authorize the acquisition.  
 
  The basic research is instead managed at the corporate level by a structure 
(Agilent Labs) that is transversely linked to the five business units. The Labs are located 
in Palo Alto, California, at the headquarter compound, even though there are other 
smaller-sized auxiliary structures (with around twenty employees each) in China, Japan 
and Scotland. Our study does not deal with the reasons for delocalizing part of the 
activity of the Labs, which can be explained by the concept of Metanational innovation 
(Doz, Santos and Williamson, 2001; Schillaci, 2003). We limit ourselves to pointing out 
how the geographic distribution of the labs reflects the objective of having centres 
present in areas where certain competences are available (software modelling for China, 
miniaturization for Japan, optics for Scotland), in order to acquire these and make them 
available to the entire corporation. 
  In addition to the business units there are also support activities: at the corporate 
level there is an organizational unit (GIO, General Infrastructure Organization) that runs 
the finance functions, human and legal resources, physical infrastructure (the so called 
WPS: Work-Place-Services) and information systems for the entire corporation. 
  After the business axis aspect of the firm we must also consider the geographical 
axis. Agilent has 29 domestic subsidiaries with specific competences. We should note 
that the role of the subsidiaries varies according to country. Within the firm the 
subsidiaries are classified by activity. The subsidiaries internally classified as “Tier 1” 
(for example, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom) carry out important industrial 
functions and are located in major economic countries (both in terms of sales volume – 
sales revenue, the presence of all the business units – and the proximity to headquarters 
of key clients). The “Tier 2” countries (for example, Singapore, Italy and France) 
instead play a business and/or industrial role of medium importance. The “Tier 3” 
countries (for example, Australia, Brazil, Finland and Israel) play only a modest 
business role.  It should be noted that this classification is neither rigid nor overly 
formalized. Nevertheless, the supply of human resources is modified depending on the 
subsidiary’s role: for example, while the Tier 1 subsidiaries have a dedicated Country 
Manager, in the Tier 2 countries the Country Manager generally also has responsibilities 
at the business unit level: for example, the Country Manager of the Italian subsidiary is 
also the European General Manager of the EMT (Electronic Manufacturing Test) sub-
business unit of the ATB business unit. 
  This classification scheme for the subsidiaries is basically in line with that 
proposed by Bartlett and Goshal (1989), which was further developed by Rugman and 
Verbeke (1992). But, contrary to these schemes, Agilent classification focuses more on the business importance of the country the subsidiary is located in and the mainly 
industrial functions of that country. Bartlett and Goshal (1989) instead use as 
parameters the competences of the subsidiary and the importance of the local context, 
while Rugman and Verbeke (1992) identify the presence of firm-specific assets as the 
distinctive criterion: that is, factors enabling the subsidiary to contribute to the 
development of firm-specific competitive advantages and country-specific assets 
(locational advantages). 
 
Figure 3. Classification Scheme of the Agilent Technologies Subsidiaries  
 
 
Source: Internal reworking of Agilent Technologies data  
 
  Our analysis shows the vertical-divisional organizational structure to be the 
prevalent one, while the geographical structure appears at a later time (“first business 
dominates, then comes geography”). In this respect, technology is a key factor and 
influences the organizational structure: the choice of location and structure (business 
unit) are technology pushed. Nevertheless, the geographical arrangement has a 
horizontal function and aims to coordinate different businesses when these operate 
within the same territory. 
  However, despite common organizational structures there are important 
differences associated with different functions. For some, such as the marketing 
function, there is a strongly global management approach (decision-making starts with 
the Group Manager and reaches the Region and the Country Manager in a unidirectional 
manner) while for others, such as R&D, there is a more decentralized decision-making 
process even involving, in line with Transnational principles, centres of competence 
outside of headquarters. In other words, the design and development is managed by 
some subsidiaries, though following headquarter guidelines. The criterion for this 
autonomy is the availability of specialized expertise and know-how, the presence of 
other research centres and universities, the proximity of important clients, etc. 
  In this regard, and in order to supports these claims, we have examined, in the 
case of Agilent Technology Italia, the distribution of competences, for the two functions under consideration, between the Group Manager (the head of the business unit), on the 
one hand, and the Country Manager (the head of the subsidiary) and Technology Centre 
Manager (the head of the research centre) on the other. 
 
6. The Role of the Functions 
The two main functions played by the Italian subsidiary concern sales and 
research and development, therefore we mainly focus on these two activities. 
 
Marketing and Sales. The Group Manager has complete autonomy in deciding 
on the commercial strategies and how to carry these out within a given country, while 
the Country Manager is responsible for the overall commercial position of Agilent 
within the country. Thus, the Country Manager in this case plays a supporting role, 
coordinating the sales forces of the various business units, developing a synergy 
between them and ensuring that the choices of a business unit do not conflict with the 
objectives of the others (for example, the choice of a particular distributor by a business 
unit some of whose products compete with those of other business units). Thus the main 
role of the Country Manager is to manage the support activities at the national level: in 
addition to the commercial activities already mentioned (Customer Satisfaction) he 
manages problems involving legal compliance and communications, both internal and 
external (People Communication and Business Assistance). These activities are his 
main responsibility, and he is judged and motivated by them. 
  The development of marketing and commercial policies are instead managed at 
higher levels, with differences according to the business in question. For some units, 
such as TMG and LSCA, sales activities are managed mainly at the national level; for 
others (SPG, ATG, CSG) the national level is less relevant, since the commercial 
strategy is aimed at a limited number of important global clients (in the case of ATG 
and CSG) or distributors (SPG). Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that the presence 
of important clients in certain areas (for example, Telco in Europe) can give the region 
or country a leading role in defining the overall commercial strategy. 
 
R&D. Slightly different considerations can be developed about the role of 
research and development. Referring to the present case study, the Turin Technology 
Center (TTC), a structure of the SPG business unit, carries out optoelectronics research 
and development. Though this centre is formally part of the Agilent Italia subsidiary, it 
depends on the business unit it belongs to. In this instance, the business link is stronger 
and more important than the geographical one. 
  As a result TTC has close and stable relations with other structures, in particular 
those outside its subsidiary. There is often an exchange of knowledge and competences 
(both technological as well as market-related - for example, regarding the choice of 
suppliers) with the other research structures of the SPG business unit, which is located 
in Ipswich and San Jose (which are formally part of the Agilent UK and U.S. 
subsidiaries, respectively). These exchanges occur in a wide variety of ways: 
audioconferences, videoconferences, visits over several days, transfers (typically from 3 
to 36 months). There are also close relations with the Agilent Labs, an external 
structure, as well as the subsidiary and the business unit. Various types of synergies can 
be exploited in this case, since the two structures work on different phases of the 
research and development process: the Labs undertake basic research, which is not aimed at any particular business unit (common needs for various products and clients) 
and have a medium-to-long run time frame. Research centres such as TTC undertake 
research focused on the needs of the clients of their own business unit and over shorter 
time frames. 
 





Source: Agilent Technologies 
 
 
However, in the case of Research and Development, the competition between 
the different centres is also fierce. The ability of the different centres in developing new 
and successful products influence the level of investment that the centres and the 
subsidiary they belong to obtain from the Headquarter. Along this function cooperation 




7. Investigating the Role of the Agilent Italia Subsidiary  
  In the introduction we presented different criteria for identifying the 
Transnational model. As we have emphasized, a key factor here is the role the 
subsidiary plays within the multinational corporation. Of particular importance is the 
existence of elements in some subsidiaries that make these centres of excellence for the entire firm. The rest of this paper will examine whether these elements exist, based on 
empirical analyses involving the Agilent Italia subsidiary. 
  The criterion that is important for a subsidiary to be considered a “centre of 
excellence” is that it develops activities and functions in a way that makes it significant 
for the entire group. In order to do this the subsidiaries must have: 
•  a high internal competence that is recognized within the firm; 
•  autonomy 
•  integration. 
 
For the purposes of our analysis we feel, as mentioned in the introduction, that we 
must distinguish between functions, since functions can follow a different logic. In the 
present case we distinguish between commercial and R&D activities. Both these 
functions exist within the Agilent Italia subsidiary. Nevertheless in order to identify a 
structure as a centre of excellence it is not necessary for all the above-mentioned 
characteristics (competence, autonomy, integration) to be present over the whole range 
of activities carried out by the subsidiary. As Frost, Birkinshaw and Ensign (2002, p. 
1000) have pointed out: “It is a mistake to equate centres of excellence with subsidiaries 
on a one-for-one basis”. In fact the excellence could be limited to a specific activity 
within the subsidiary. For this reason we prepared a questionnaire for the Country 
Manager as well as the Turin Technology Center Manager. The objective was to verify 
whether elements exist that qualify the structure as a centre of excellence in terms of the 
two functions under consideration. 
 
  The first condition for determining that a structure is a centre of excellence is 
that it possesses competences, and that these are recognized by the headquarters. In turn, 
the competences can be subsidiary-specific, or unique to the subsidiary, or country-
specific (Rugman and Verbeke, 1992), that is deriving from being part of a particular 
local context (embedded local competences, borrowing Dunning’s terminology).  
  In particular, to determine whether Agilent Italia possesses the necessary 
competences we have used the following criteria: 
•  the amount of investment by the headquarters in the Italian subsidiary 
over the last three years; 
•  the introduction of patents and new products; 
•  availability of specialized workers; 
•  relations with research centers and universities; 
•  proximity of important clients; 
•  presence of key suppliers; 
•  granting of special charters to the subsidiary. 
 
Our findings show a large investment by the headquarters in the Italian 
subsidiary and a better-than-average trend in employment with respect to the other 
subsidiaries. This can be interpreted as a recognition by the headquarter of the 
importance of the Italian location (KPMG, 2004). In this regard Agilent Italia has made 
a strong contribution (thanks in particular to TTC) to the development of new patents 
and products that have had success at the international level. We can thus state that at 
least the R&D role has had an impact that goes beyond the domestic market. Among the 
country-specific reasons for locating in Italy are the availability of skilled workers and 
the existence of research centres and universities. Factors that were not considered important were the presence of important clients and, even more so, strategic suppliers. 
It’s important stressing out how with regard to important clients the situation is varied. 
There are some business units with important clients, such as CSG, whose clients 
include TIM, Telecom Italia, Vodafone-Omnitel, Wind, etc., and SPG, with 
STMicroelectronics as a client. On the other hand, in the field of research and electronic 
manufacturing (board/appliances) there are no significant customers. 
 
  The second factor we have investigated is the degree of autonomy. By this we 
mean that strategic decisions are made directly by the subsidiary and not at higher 
levels. In this regard, in order to determine whether a subsidiary is autonomous it is 
more important to consider how strategic decisions are reached and to evaluate them 
than their mere approval. We believe it is more important that the choice be identified, 
evaluated and made by the subsidiary than the fact that headquarters approval is 
necessary to carry them out. 
  In the present case the acquisition by Agilent Technology of Silicon Micro 
Systems – a subsidiary of Gefran Sensori, a group that operates in the field of applied 
research regarding the automation of industrial processes – provides an indication of 
autonomy. The acquisition, which occurred in April 2001 and involved an overall 
investment of $40 million (which included taking on 15 employees from the Provaglio 
d’Iseo centre), was proposed by the Turin Technology Center. The latter was aware of 
the specialized activities of the Provaglio firm, and saw its inclusion in the 
Semiconductor Products Group Business Unit as a way to consolidate the leadership of 
Agilent in the field of optical communication components. The acquisition by Agilent 
Technologies of Silicon Micro Systems (renamed Silicon Optics Operation – SOO) 
made it possible, among other things, for the company to broaden its product range, 
thanks to SOO’s technological contribution. In this way the local subsidiary, in 
accordance with the Transnational approach, played a contributing role in the 
company’s internationalization by incorporating local expertise
1. 
  In order to judge more precisely the effective degree of autonomy we have 
referred to several criteria taken from the conceptual approach of Frost, Birkinshaw and 
Ensign (2002), which we have appropriately added to and modified. More specifically, 
we have tried to determine at what level the following decisions were made: 
•  hiring of the subsidiary’s management; 
•  internal organizational changes; 
•  starting up of new businesses within the country; 
•  direct investment (FDI) in the country; 
•  entry into foreign markets; 
•  introduction of new products. 
 
With reference to our parameters the answers show that, as a rule, the decisions 
are taken at headquarters (in the sense of the headquarters of the specific business) 
autonomously (especially regarding the launch of new products or the entry into outside 
markets), or in some cases after consulting with the subsidiary (in the case of the start 
up of new businesses within the country the subsidiary is located in). On the other hand, 
decisions regarding the hiring of personnel (even in non-managerial positions) and 
                                                 
1 In December 2003 the investment in SOO was discontinued due to the fall in the market for 
telecommunications components and the continuing pessimistic forecasts for this sector. internal organizational decisions are left to the subsidiary, though these require the final 
approval of the headquarters. 
 
  The third important variable for classifying a subsidiary as a centre of excellence 
is the degree of integration of the subsidiary within the multinational as well as the local 
context it operates in (Martinez and Jarillo, 1991). In other words, whether or not the 
subsidiary carries out functions not limited to the local market (the so-called 
Multidomestic logic) but instead contributes to defining and implementing the overall 
strategy of the multinational. For this to occur there must be organizational routines and 
mechanisms by which information and knowledge can be transferred between 
subsidiaries as well as between the subsidiary and headquarters. To this end, we believe 
that formal as well as informal mechanisms are necessary. These are important not only 
as means for the transfer and sharing of knowledge but also as mechanisms of control. 
  We have identified in particular the following criteria: 
•  Meetings within the subsidiary; 
•  Meetings between the subsidiaries and headquarters; 
•  Exchange of knowledge among the various subsidiaries; 
•  The taking on of various responsibilities by the personnel of the subsidiary; 
•  Exchanges of management, number of managers expatriates; 
•  Control mechanisms. 
 
With regard to the degree of integration, we found that at the subsidiary level a 
series of meetings are organized with different frequencies and involving different 
personnel. These meetings represent a formal occasion for the discussion, evaluation 
and exchange of ideas by personnel from different functions or groups within the 
subsidiary. The objective, within a multidivisional organizational structure, is to achieve 
coordination at the local level where the various business units are in contact with each 
other and need to share resources and strategies. The Country Management Council, 
which meets on average twice a month, is made up of the Country Manager, the local 
sales managers of the various business units, and the local managers of the support 
functions. The objectives of these meetings are: 1) to look into the opportunities and 
problems arising from the coexistence of the various business units that, because of 
their size, often have to share support activities and space; 2) develop and manage 
initiatives which aim at strengthening the sense of belonging and the cohesion in the 
business units. The Management Meeting meets once or twice a year and is open to all 
managers from the area the subsidiary operates in; the objective of the meeting is to 
present the situation of the firm and discuss important and topical issues. 
  In addition to coordinating mechanisms within the subsidiaries, there is also 
coordination among the subsidiaries as well as between the latter and the headquarter. 
The most important of these is the global meeting among the Country Managers and the 
Top Management, whose purpose is to present and discuss the group’s strategy. 
  While there are no significant differences in the answers from the Country 
Manager and the TTC Manager with regard to the mechanisms of integration, this is not 
the case regarding control mechanisms. We can observe that the informal mechanisms 
(HQ-subsidiary meetings) do not play a key role. The controls are instead focused on 
the activities carried on by each function. 
The control of the R&D function concentrates on assessing the capacity for 
innovation, examining the results achieved not only in terms of new products but also the number of patents and research projects, and the ability to shift easily from one type 
of production to another. We see  from this that the assessment not only has short-term 
objectives (product development) but also medium-to-long term ones (patents/research 
projects), and even takes in aspects which cannot be expressed strictly in quantitative 
terms: for example, in the case of the TTC the “capacity to teach” is considered: that is, 
the ability to advance knowledge within the company over time (the “learning and 
growth perspective”, using Kaplan and Norton’s (1996) terminology). 
  In terms of the country manager’s activity, the control mechanisms mainly 
concern costs and not sales:  this confirms that the country level does not have any 
autonomous marketing functions (which are directly run by the headquarter of the 
business units) but primarily a role in managing the support activities. 
 
8. Discussion and conclusion 
We started our investigation with two interconnected research questions. The 
first aimed at identifying what kind of subsidiary Agilent Technologies Italy is, while 
the second focused more on what we can understand about the overall strategy and 
structure of the firms by analysing a national subunit.  
  The analysis shows that Agilent Technologies does not match any of the models 
proposed in the literature. In fact, we can view the structure of Agilent from three 
different and complementary prospectives: 
•  first, by business type (business axis), which views the firm as a group of five 
business units; 
•  second, by geographical type (geographical axis), where the firm is seen as a set 
of 29 national subsidiaries; 
•  third, in terms of a functional axis, which considers the set of activities/phases of 
Agilent’s value chain. 
 
The first interpretation has the most explanatory value, since, as previously noted, in 
a highly-diversified high-tech firm such as Agilent the business axis tends to play a 
dominant role: the decision where to locate the various activities is made mainly on the 
basis of business needs. 
  Nevertheless, the business axis alone cannot completely explain the 
organizational structure and processes. From this perspective a consideration of the 
functional axis can help to explain the organizational makeup of Agilent. 
Our research showed that the only way to answer the research questions was to 
divide these questions among the different functions. Answers differed according to the 
different function we considered.  
In terms of manufacturing, Agilent appears to be a global firm with 
homogeneous products and high economies of scales, while in terms of marketing the 
Multidomestic approach seems more appropriate for some products, and the Global, or 
Regional approach for others. Nonetheless, the intense exchange of personnel is typical 
of the informal mode of control that characterises the Transnational model. 
In terms of R&D we have a centralisation of basic research (as stated by Casson 
and Singh, 1993), while business units and subsidiaries tend to focus on development. 
Informal factors play a key role here (see Kim, Park and Prescott 2003). 
This comes as no surprise. As Malnight (1995) has already demonstrated, 
globalisation is a multi-stage process where functions show different levels of internationalisation. What is a surprise is that this concept has not been developed for a 
long time; only recently scholars (Kim, Park and Prescott, 2003, and Rugman and 
Verbeke, 2001) have recognised that along with horizontal differences (between 
subsidiaries) vertical differences (by business and function) are also important. 
We therefore conclude that a clear-cut distinction between different kinds of 
subsidiaries seems very difficult to make and is scarcely relevant. Methods of control 
and centralisation typical of global firms exist side-by-side with control devices and 
horizontal links typical of the Transnational organisation.  
The limitations of the study are those typical of case study research (only one 
case, problem of generalisation): in particular we focuses on only one subsidiary in one 
specific country. 
Despite these limitations our work, at a theoretical as well as practical level, 
shows some interesting results. 
In terms of theory, the role of function is restated and future research along these 
lines could be promising. How different modes of control and strategy setting can be 
combined within the same firms with both vertical and horizontal differentiation 
(between business and functions)? 
From the practical point of view, our results seem to confirm that managers 
could and sometimes should have a differentiated approach to subsidiaries; but they 
should also try to differentiate according to the different functions. The final result of 
this process combined with globalisation could result in an organisational structure and 
a strategic approach that could be even more complex and differentiated than in the 
Transnational model. Bibliography 
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